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THE WAR ON CYBERTERROR: WHY AUSTRALIA
SHOULD EXAMINE THE U.S. APPROACH TO CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Elizabeth Tutmarct
Abstract: As the global community focuses on detecting and fighting terrorisn,
defense strategists have identified the vulnerability of certain cybersystems. Traditional
methods of defense and warfare, however, often do not apply to new technologies. Thus
the cybercommunity is developing new standards for protecting computer resources
against terrorist attack.
From the perspective of national governments, much attention has been paid to the
importance of secure "critical infrastructure." This category of computer-dependent
resources includes sectors vital to the smooth and orderly operation of public society,
such as transportation, communications, and food production. These sectors are
becoming increasingly dependent on computers to function, and the majority of critical
infrastructure is owned by the private sector. This relationship between the public's
interest in critical infrastructure and the interests of the private sector raises questions
about how to balance the public and private interests in a cyberterror protection plan.
While governments have an interest in ensuring the security of critical
infrastructure, they are reluctant to directly regulate privately-owned businesses. Since
the late 1990s, the United States has been developing methods to secure infrastructure
through public-private information-sharing partnerships, and has successfully taken steps
to respect corporate privacy in the process. Conversely, Australia is in the early stages of
developing a national strategy for critical infrastructure protection, and the government
has faced corporate resistance to developing an information-sharing security network.
In comparing the cybersecurity situation in Australia to that in the United States, the
Australian government should follow many of the steps that have made the U.S. process
such a success to date. In particular, it should adopt similar corporate privacy protection
policies for information shared with the government for critical infrastructure protection
purposes, and should emphasize the development of public-private co-regulation of
critical infrastructure. While the United States has not yet reached complete
cybersecurity, its extra years of experience should inform the development of Australian
policymaking.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a consequence of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
many countries have integrated terrorism legislation into their existing
crime-prevention schemes. This new legislation has often provoked concern
from members of the legal community. For instance, anti-terror measures in
t The author wishes to thank the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal and Prof.
Jane Winn for skilled assistance, her family for supportive encouragement, and Jason Sykes for love and
insightful conversation.
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Australia have been accompanied by complaints from privacy advocates,'
2
and the country's most recent anti-terror legislation is no exception.
Australia's initial anti-terror legislation was drafted shortly after September
11, 3 but the death of eighty-eight Australians in the October 12, 2002,
terrorist bombing in Bali brought renewed vigor to Australia's attempts to
address terrorist threats.4 Strong Labor Party opposition to proposed
amendments to Australia's anti-terrorism legislation stalled passage until the
end of the 2002 legislative session.5  After reintroduction of the
amendments, 6 they were eventually revised7 and enacted.8
One of the reasons for the new legislation is that Australia is
concerned with effects of terrorism on its business community.
9
Cyberterrorists pose a threat to the networked computers used by most
businesses and can exploit security vulnerabilities to cause serious harm.' 0
Information technology experts suggest that a way to minimize the effect of
network vulnerabilities is to promote a dialogue within industries to discuss
security risks and remedies and to develop cybersecurity standards."
Private corporations provide many of Australia's basic services, such
Julia Limb, Getting the Balance Right: National Surveillance and Privacy Rights, THE WORLD
TODAY, Sept. 8, 2003, available at http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2003/s941473.htm (last
visited Apr. 29, 2004); Rachel Lebihan, Banks Won 't Give Data for Terror Checks, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV.,
May 29, 2003, at 3; Ruth Peters, ABA's Murray Says Govt Must Protect Customer Privacy, AAP
NEWSFEED, May 28, 2003; Privacy Commissioner Slams New Anti-Terror Laws, AAP NEWSFEED, March
20, 2003; Doug Conway, Big Brother is Watching - Get Used to It, AAP NEWSFEED, Feb. 28, 2003; Terror
Technology Goes Over the Top, GOLD COAST BULL., June 1, 2002; Kathryn Torpy, Terror Sparks Privacy
Crackdown, COURIER MAIL, Sept. 25, 2001, at 3.
2 Privacy Commissioner Slams New Anti-Terror Laws, supra note 1.
3 Sophie Morris, No Need for Tougher Terror Laws, Says ALP -Terror Hits Home - Bali and After,
THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 16, 2002, at 5.
4 Australia to Review Anti-Terror Laws, Nov. 3, 2003, at
http://www.news.com.aulcommon/storypage/0,4057,7755053%5E2,00.htmil (last visited May 21, 2004).
5 Govt Rejects Watering Down of ASI Bill, AAP NEWSFEED, Aug. 18, 2002; Aust Govt Lays Aside
Tougher ASIO Laws, AAP NEWSFEED, Dec. 13, 2002; Jim Dickins, Build-Up in ASIO Powers Blocked,
COURIER MAIL, Dec. 14, 2003, at 3; ASIO's Committee's Changes Still Flawed, AAP NEWSFEED, Dec. 4,
2002.
6 ASIO Bill to be Reintroduced to Parliament, AAP NEWSFEED, March 20, 2003.
7 Australian Security Intelligence Organization Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill, 2002,
(Austl.), available at http://www.scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/bills/O/2003/0/2003032102.htm (last visited
May 21, 2004). See also Minor Parties Stall ASIO Bill, HERALD SUN, June 20, 2003, at 6.
. The current form of the bill, including all amendments through December 2003, can be found at
Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act, 1979, available at
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/htmil/pasteact/0/48/pdf/ASIO1979.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004). See
generally ASIO Bill Gets Nod, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 26, 2003, at 9.
9 See generally Attorney-General's Department, Information for Owners and Operators of Critical
Infrastructure, available at
www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/www/nationalsecurityhome.nsf/HeadingPagesDisplay/Business+Information
?OpenDocument (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter Information for Owners].
1o See generally id.
1 See generally id.
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as public utilities, banking, and transportation; thus the federal government
does not have direct access to these industries' security information.
1 2
Because of the government's interest in national security, however, former
Australian Attorney-General Daryl Williams created an information-sharing
network to promote the exchange of security data within these critical
industries.1 3 There is a tension between the corporate sector and the public
interest inherent in information-sharing programs, as private businesses are
concerned with protecting their reputations and the government seeks to
collect sensitive information to encourage increased cybersecurity. While
this scheme of public-private critical infrastructure protection is new in
Australia, the United States has been working on a similar program since
1998.14
This Comment argues that Australia should look to the critical
infrastructure protection program in the United States and consider its
balance between corporate privacy and cybersecurity. Part II of this
Comment describes the history and current state of critical infrastructure
protection in Australia. Part III addresses Australia's privacy legislation,
and how it interacts with security-related information-sharing as part of
Australia's critical infrastructure protection efforts. Part IV highlights the
problems Australia faces in creating a federal plan for critical infrastructure
protection. Part V focuses on the U.S. experience in protecting its critical
infrastructure, arguing that it has, to date, been generally successful in doing
so. Part VI applies experiences in the United States to analogous
information-sharing situations in Australia and provides recommendations
for a smooth implementation of Australia's new scheme to ensure protection
of its critical infrastructure.
II. UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER-DEPENDENT RESOURCES AND CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
Both private business and the public sector increasingly rely on
computers and networked systems to function effectively.1 5  The
vulnerabilities of this dependency on computers, however, are increasingly
12 id.
13 Id.
14 Ronald L. Dick, The Legal Aspects of Infrastructure Protection, Speech at InfowarCon 2001, at 3
(Sept. 5, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.nipc.gov/pressroom/pressrel/090501.pdf) (last visited
May 21, 2004).
15 See generally COMPUTER SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY BOARD, CYBERSECURITY TODAY &
TOMORROW: PAY Now OR PAY LATER 2 (2002) (giving examples in which nearly every business relies on
computer systems) [hereinafter CYBERSECURITY TODAY].
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being exposed. 16 As the phenomenon of cybercrime becomes increasingly
widespread in Australia, it is being addressed not only by the information
technology sector, but also through legislation and law enforcement.'
7
A. Securing Cyber Resources Against Crime and Terror Requires
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Virtually all sections of society and industry have become
increasingly dependent on computers and most businesses in any given field
use computers for multiple functions.18 Because most corporate computers
are connected in a network and also usually connected to the Internet, these
linked computers are considered a type of foundational infrastructure
supporting those industries that rely on computerized processes.' 9  A
properly functioning "critical infrastructure allows industries to
consistently conduct operations necessary to provide products and vital
services without unneeded delays, corruption of data, or unauthorized access
to the network system.2'
The importance of understanding the ways in which a network can be
vulnerable gained widespread public attention during compliance
preparation leading up to the year 2000.22 Since then, both the public and
governments across the globe have become aware of the negative effects of
widespread network failures.23 The September 11 th attacks have increased
concern about vulnerabilities in the networks of vital-services providers and
:6 See generally CYBERSECURITY TODAY, supra note 15, at 3.
'7 See, e.g., Cybercrime Act, 2001, (Austl.), available at
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/3/3486/pdfl/61of 20 0 I.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004).
's CYBERSECURITY TODAY, supra note 15, at 2.
'9 Id. at 3.
20 Defined in the United States as "telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation,
water systems, and emergency services, both governmental and private." THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION
DIRECTIVE 63 (1998), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc3.html
(last visited May 21, 2004). This definition includes the industries defined as "critical infrastructure" in
most other countries, including Australia. See Trusted Information Sharing Network, The Purpose of the
Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection, at www.cript.gov.au (last
visited May 21, 2004).
2 CYBERSECURTY TODAY, supra note 15, at 3.
22 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY CAN DRAW ON YEAR 2000 EXPERIENCES 24 (1999), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ai0000l.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004). The so-called Y2K problem
involved possible inconsistencies in computer-based programs during the date conversion transition from
1999 to 2000. Id. at 3.
23 COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, TRUST IN CYBERSPACE I (Fred B.
Schneider ed., 1999) [hereinafter TRUST IN CYBERSPACE].
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heightened the level of priority for securing critical infrastructure. 24 One of
the ways to secure critical infrastructure is through the sharing of security
and vulnerability information across industries, in order to promote
awareness of threats and to increase cooperation between government and
the private sector.
25
Beyond being simply a tool for promoting awareness, information-
sharing between the public and private sectors is supported by some in the
information technology community as essential to protect against threats.26
Attacks by cybercriminals can interrupt a region's communications, halt
transportation methods, or leave financial institutions open to theft.
27
Because a network depends upon the strength of each computer within the
network, a single computer left open to a threat poses substantial risks to the
28rest of the system. Creating standards of network trustworthiness through
information sharing provides one method by which various industries can
seek to maintain the integrity of the entire system.
29
As part of a critical infrastructure protection strategy, businesses share
information relating to system vulnerabilities (such as the number of
incidents of attacks on the network) and remedies as a way to promote
awareness within a particular industry sector.3 ° A large percentage of
security breaches go unreported because the affected business does not
realize that they have occurred. 31 A dialogue regarding cybersecurity is
intended to counter this effect.32 Another purpose of information sharing is
to develop a warning system to alert other critical industries if a large-scale
threat is encountered by one sector. 33 Information sharing among computer
network-reliant industries not only serves to assist the businesses themselves
in combating crime, but also is a vital piece of a broad, national counter-
terrorism policy.
34
24 CYBERSECURjTY TODAY, supra note 15, at 6.
25 TRUST IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 253.
26 id.
27 CYBERSECURITY TODAY, supra note 15, at 6.
21 See id. at 7.
29 See TRUST IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 251.
30 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: SIGNIFICANT
HOMELAND SECURITY CHALLENGES NEED TO BE ADDRESSED 9 (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02918t.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter SIGNIFICANT
CHALLENGES].
"' Id. at 11.
32 See generally id.
" Id. at 21.
34 See generally id.
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B. Australia is in the Early Stages of Developing Critical Infrastructure
Protections, but is Still Developing Implementation Plans
As Australia encounters evidence of computer-network vulnerabilities
and infrastructure dependence, the national government has passed laws in
the hopes of preventing cybercrime.35 An information-sharing network is
being designed,36 but the Australian government is almost entirely reliant on
private businesses to create a system that can share information and
strengthen critical infrastructure. Although the Australian government is
reluctant to impose regulations on private businesses, it recognizes that the
security of the country is dependent upon the private sector's ability to
detect and prevent cybercrime.
7
1. Australia's Efforts to Combat Cybercrime
Australia has already encountered incidents of cybercrime at the
national level.38  In 2001, an Internet financial network was attacked,
revealing the private information of 1200 credit card customers. 39 In 2003, a
hacker compromised another business network and gained access to the
account information of 400,000 customers. 40  Australia's public utilities
system also fell victim to cybercrime in 2001, when 150 computer-
controlled sewage-pumping systems were redirected to pump raw sewage
into public waterways, causing thousands of dollars of damage to the area.4 '
Australian businesses have expressed concern over their vulnerability to
such security attacks,42  especially in sectors dependent upon large
computerized networks. Surveys reveal gaps in many Australian businesses'
cybersecurity systems, yet there is a lack of evidence that these businesses
43
are taking steps to make their networks more secure.
'5 See, e.g., Cybercrime Act, 2001 (Austl.).
36 Trusted Information Sharing Network, Information Sharing Arrangements, at
http://www.cript.gov.au/www/cripthome.nsf/AllDocs/RWPB7704EI603A9BF99CA256CF7000398F5?Op
enDocument (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter Information Sharing Arrangements].
37 Sue Cant, Warning on Cyber Terror, AGE (Melbourne), Feb. 24, 2004, at 1.
38 Rachel Lebihan, Government Gets Tough on Hackers, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., July 1, 2003, at 29;
Gary Hughes, The Cyberspace Invaders, SUNDAY AGE, June 22, 2003, at 15.
39 Lebihan, supra note 38.
40 Hughes, supra note 38.
4' Glenis Green, Sewage Overflow Linked to 'Hacker,' COURIER MAIL, June 16, 2000, at 14;
Hughes, supra note 38; Lebihan, supra note 38.
42 Paul Osborne, Cyber-Crime Threatens Business, Says Minister, AAP NEWSFEED, May 11, 2003.
43 Jennifer Foreshew, Security Warning on Internet Telephony, THE AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 2, 2004, at
31; Cant, supra note 37; Karen Dearne, Business Ignores Hacking Dangers, THE AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 30,
2002, at B02.
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Some steps to secure Australia's critical infrastructure have been
taken at the federal level. Australia's National Office of Information
Economy ("NOIE") requested that the nation's security experts advise the
federal government on how to develop critical infrastructure security plans.
4
To help do so, NOIE created the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council
("CIAC"), which met for the first time in February 2004. 4  The CIAC
consists of security experts from around Australia who will collect security
information from various critical industries and advise them on how to
increase security. 46  Government officials admit that Australia is behind
some other countries in developing an infrastructure security strategy, but
claim that the delay allows Australia to learn from others' experiences.47
Australia's Labor Party has proposed the creation of a Department of
Homeland Security, which would lead the effort to secure critical
48infrastructure. Prime Minister Howard's Liberal Party, however, supports
a "multi-layered" approach to national security, without the centralization of
security under a federal department. 49 The federal election expected to occur
later this year, possibly in October, may determine which approach to
national security Australia will be implemented in the future .5
2. Questions Remain Regarding the Efficacy of Australia's Trusted
Information-Sharing Network
Following September 11, the Australian government created the
Trusted Information-Sharing Network ("TISN") by asking a variety of
industries to voluntarily share information that it believed could help prevent
4 Rachel Lebihan, Specialists Tapped for IT Security Panel, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Jan. 12, 2004,
at 40; Mark Davis et al., Briefs: Infrastructure Security, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Feb. 26, 2004, at 4.
45 Lebihan, supra note 44.
46 Michael Gordon, Be Alert for Terrorism, Bosses Told, AGE (Melbourne), Feb. 26, 2004, at 3;
Lebihan, supra note 44.
47 Lebihan, supra note 44. For information on Great Britain's infrastructure protection efforts, see
National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre, at http://www.niscc.gov.uk/index.html (last visited
May 21, 2004).
48 Marcus Priest, Legal Services to be Unified, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Jan. 30, 2004, at 13; Latham
Maintains His Tough-on-Security Campaign, AAP NEWSFEED, Jan. 19, 2004; David Penberthy, Latham the
Leader of Howard's People, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Jan. 31, 2004, at 17; Patrick Walters,
Security Means 'Self-Reliance,' THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 30, 2004, at 6; Fleur Anderson, Policy Power:
Battlelines Drawn for Federal Election, THE ADVERTISER (Austl.), Jan. 31, 2004, at 29.
49 Anderson, supra note 48.
so Canberra Watches 'Beattie Factor' With Interest, GOLD COAST BULL. (Austl.), Jan. 14, 2004, at
23; James Grubel, State Showdown Point to Federal Poll, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Jan. 14, 2004, at
10. Australian federal elections are held every three years, but prime ministers can also call for elections
earlier. See Parliamentary Education Office, Comparison of U.S. and Australian Federal Legislatures,
available at www.peo.gov.au/resources/us aus.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
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cyberterrorism. 51  The TISN affects industries considered to be critical
infrastructure and requests that these industries share information related to
cybersecurity. 52  Such information includes data on a business' general
systems attacks/failures, vulnerabilities yet to be exploited by criminals, and
strategies to prevent network exploitation.53 The CIAC acts as an advisory
link between the TISN and the Australian attorney-general, helping to
coordinate communication between the sectors represented in the TISN and
also with the federal government.
4
The government's requests for an information-sharing process,
however, have not been accompanied by a specific plan to protect customer
and corporate confidentiality. Specifically, the banking industry has been
resistant to the TISN without such privacy safeguards. 55 The banking sector
has indicated that, without statutory protection for customer 5privacy,
government intervention will run counter to the public's interest. More
recently, the private sector has raised concerns about public access to
confidential business information regarding system vulnerabilities. 7
Australian businesses are not eager to allow disclosure of such information
because of possible damage to their reputation and fear of government
regulation.58
The TISN is still in the process of being designed and organized, and
the privacy concerns that have already been raised help to explain private-
sector reluctance to the sharing of cybersecurity information. 59 In order for
Australia to effectively promote information-sharing as a method of
infrastructure protection, uncertainty in the legal framework of corporate
privacy must be eliminated. While there are many reasons why
organizations, especially private-sector businesses, may be reluctant to enter
51 Robin Robertson, Information Sharing Starts to Get Personal, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., July 17,
2003, at 2.
52 Trusted Information-Sharing Network, http://www.cript.gov.au (last visited May 21, 2004).
53 Information Sharing Arrangements, supra note 36.
54 Trusted Information-Sharing Network, The Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council, at
www.cript.gov.auwww/CriptHome.nsf/HeadingPagesDisplay/CIAC?OpenDocument (last visited May 21,
2004).
55 Lebihan, supra note 1.
56 Peters, supra note 1.
57 See, e.g., Derek Parker, The Winds of Change: Logistics Industry Faces a New Frontier, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at TO1.
58 Id.
59 Information Sharing Arrangements, supra note 36; Attorney-General Daryl Williams, Launch of
the Trusted Information Sharing Network, Speech at National Summit on Critical Infrastructure Protection
(Apr. 2, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/www/attomeygeneralHome.nsf/
Web+Pages/E075727E8067D IOECA256CFC0005E76C?OpenDocument) (last visited May 21, 2004).
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into information-sharing agreements, 60 little progress on information-sharing
can be made until these concerns are addressed.
III. AUSTRALIA'S LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING CORPORATE
PRIVACY
In combating cybercrime and terrorism, Australia's public and private
sectors rely on federal legislation not only for definitions of applicable
crimes, but also for the available protections.6' While critical infrastructure
protection is focused on the prevention of cyberterrorism, the expansion of
criminal definitions to specifically include acts of terrorism is also a crucial
part of a broad counterterrorism policy. The Australian Security Intelligence
Organization (Terrorism) Act 1979,62 the Freedom of Information Act
198263 and the Privacy Act 198864 create the legislative framework of
Australia's system of critical infrastructure protection.
A. Recent Australian Security Intelligence Organization Legislation Has
Changed the Privacy Law/Infrastructure Security Regime by Defining
Terrorism Offenses
Australia's main piece of anti-terror legislation, the Australian
Security Intelligence Organization (Terrorism) Act 2002 ("Terrorism Act"),
expands the Australian government's capacity to fight terrorism by granting
extended warrant, search, and surveillance powers to the Australian Security
Intelligence Organization ("ASIO").65  Part 5.3 of the Terrorism Act, which
includes the definitions section, also specifically expands the definition of
60 See, e.g., Armitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Information-Sharing in Critical Infrastructure
Industries: Understanding Behavioral and Economic Impediments, GEO. MASON U. L. & ECON. WORKING
PAPER SERIES (2003).
61 See generally Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act, 1979, available at
http://scaleplus.law.gov.authtml/pasteact/0/48/top.htm. The overlap between cybercrime and terrorism is
evident in Australian Security Intelligence Organization Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) 2002,
Explanatory Memorandum, available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/ems/0/2002/0/2002032515.htm
(last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter ASIO Amendment Explanatory Memo].
62 Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act, 1979, supra note 61.
63 Freedom of Information Act, 1982, (Austl.), available at
scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/58/pdf/FOI1982.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004).
64 Privacy Act, 1988, (Austl.), available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/htm/pasteact/0/157/top.htm
(last visited May 21, 2004).
65 ASIO Amendment Explanatory Memo, supra note 61. The ASIO is Australia's federal security
organization, which advises the government on security matters and collects and investigates security
intelligence. See ASIO Act, supra note 61, § 17, for further explanation of the functions of the ASIO.
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terrorism to include cyberthreats.66 An action is considered an act of
cyberterror if it:
seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an
electronic system including, but not limited to:
(i) an information system; or
(ii) a telecommunications system; or
(iii) a financial system; or
(iv) a system used for the delivery of essential
government services; or
(v) a system used for, or by, an essential public utility;
or
(vi) a system used for, or by, a transport system. 67
This anti-terror legislation recognizes the threat of cyberterrorism and is part
of the government's effort to secure Australia's critical infrastructure.
The ASIO legislation builds on the criminal definitions and
punishment scheme of the Cybercrime Act 2001 ("Cybercrime Act").68 The
Cybercrime Act defines electronic crimes and law enforcement powers
relating to computers, and expands traditional criminal law and procedure to
computers and networks. 69 The Australian Attorney-General's Department
states that the Cybercrime Act and Australia's anti-terror legislation
demonstrate to the business community that cybercrime will be treated
seriously. 70  While the Cybercrime Act and the Terrorism Act provide
investigation and punishment schemes for cyberterrorism, the Australian
government has also demonstrated its willingness to prevent terrorism
through critical infrastructure protection.
71
6 Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism), 2000, (Austl.) pts. 5.3, 100.1 (Definitions),
available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/3/3590/pdf/SecLegAmTerrorism2002.pdf (last
visited May 21, 2004).
67 Id. pts. 5.3, 100.1(2)(e).
68 Cybercrime Act, 2001, (Austl.), available at
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/3/3486/top.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).
69 Id. scheds. 1 & 2.
70 Attorney-General's Department, Implementing a 'Culture of Security' in Australia, available at
webdominol .oecd.org/COMNET/STI/IccpSecu.nsf/viewHtml/index/$FILE/Australia.pdf. Australia's
parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission held hearings on cybercrime July 17-
21, 2003, discussing the enforcement coordination and preventative methods in place in Australia.
Transcripts of these discussions are available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/commttee/J-ACC.htm
(last visited May 21, 2004).
7 Trusted Information Sharing Network, Relationship with National Counter- Terrorism Committee,
at www.cript.gov.au/www/CriptHome.nsf/HeadingPagesDisplay/National+CounterTerrorism+Committee?
OpenDocument (last visited May 21, 2004).
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B. The Freedom of Information Act of 1982 Interacts with ASIO
Legislation to Provide a Check on Government Terrorist
Investigations
While ASIO legislation provides the legal path by which the
government can gather information about individuals of interest in terrorist
investigations, Australia's Freedom of Information Act 1982 ("AusFOIA")
allows individuals and organizations to gain access to certain government
documents. 2 AusFOIA creates a process by which the public can obtain
copies of government documents, but access is limited if such a release is
against the public interest.73
AusFOIA defines certain limited exceptions to the general
presumption that the public has a right to access government documents.74
The Privacy Commissioner 75 has asserted that it is not the intent of the TISN
to disclose sensitive personal data or corporate trade secrets. 76 Yet because
the federal government would gain access to information shared between
businesses through the TISN, AusFOIA claims could potentially be used to
obtain these documents.77 Documents shared with the government under the
TISN program could fall under a number of exemption provisions 78 in
AusFOIA. AusFOIA's section 43 exempts confidential business documents
from disclosure requests. 79 Specifically, trade secrets and other information
that would have less commercial value if they were disclosed are exempted
from AusFOIA claims under this provision.80 This section may have limited
applicability to the TISN, however, because it was not intended to be a
forum for the sharing of trade secrets; cyber vulnerabilities are considered
common to many infrastructure industries and more general in scope than
72 Freedom of Information Act, 1982, (Austl.), available at
http://www.scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/58/top.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).71 Id. pt. 1(3)(1)(c).
74 Information Sharing Arrangements, supra note 36.
75 Australia's Privacy Counissioner is in charge of regulating federal privacy, which involves
responsibilities ranging from investigating complaints under the Privacy Act to issuing guidelines for
compliance with privacy policies. See The Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/about/index.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
76 Rachel Lebihan, Eyes Wide Open on Trusted Data Sharing Network, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., June
19, 2003, at 18.
77 Information Sharing Arrangements, supra note 36.
78 AusFOIA's numerous exemptions have been criticized for their vague and confusing language,
but the act has generally been viewed as a positive step toward open government in Australia. See Debra L.
Silverman, Freedom of Information: Will Blair Be Able to Break Down the Walls of Secrecy In Britain?, 13
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 471, 544-545 (1997).
79 Freedom ofInformation Act (Austi.) § 43.
'o Id. § 43(1) & (3).
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the confidential business information typically considered a trade secret.
81
Section 43 also exempts information from disclosure that would have
an adverse effect on the undertaking of an organization related to "its lawful
business, commercial or financial affairs, 82 and information that, if
disclosed, could "reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of
information to the Commonwealth., 83  Information shared with the
government regarding private sector system vulnerabilities meets both
requirements of section 43, because such information relates to business
undertaking, and disclosure of such information could make vulnerable
industries less willing to share data with the TISN.
AusFOIA's section 45 also guarantees the privacy of documents
procured by the government in confidence if the source of the document
could succeed with a claim for breach of confidence if the document was
disclosed.84 Information procured by the government might fall under this
category if the procurement resulted in a relationship of trust between the
government and the private business.
85
Because AusFOIA claims are handled on a case-by-case basis,
however, it is difficult to guarantee that a business's vulnerabilities will not
be disclosed by the government under any circumstances.86  Without a
specific exemption for such documents, businesses will continue to use
AusFOIA concerns as a rationale for avoiding information-sharing.8 7
C. The Privacy Act 1988 Limits Both the Public's and the Private
Sector's Ability to Disclose Personal Information, but it is Unclear if
Critical Infrastructure Information is Included
In addition to the right of access granted by AusFOIA, the Privacy
Act 1988 ("Privacy Act") assures Australians that their government will
comply with certain minimum standards to protect the privacy of their
personal information.88 The Privacy Act also creates an independent federal
a' Information Sharing Arrangements, supra note 36.
82 Freedom of Information Act (Austi.) § 43(1)(c)(i).
I3 d. § 43(l)(c)(ii).
Id.§ 45.
85 A relationship of trust would exist if, for instance, the government's procurement had been
accompanied by a confidentiality agreement, stating that the government would not disclose the
information it received from the private business.
86 Information Sharing Arrangements, supra note 36.
87 See, e.g., The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee,
Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force Report § 2.2 (2001), available at
http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/ISCIPReport-Final.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).
88 Privacy Act, 1988, (Austl.), pmbl., available at
scaleplus.law.gov.auhtml/pasteact/O/1 57/pdf/Privacyl988.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004).
VOL. 13 No. 3
AUSTRALIA 'S WAR ON CYBERTERROR
entity, the Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, to oversee all
privacy-related complaints and conduct investigations into breaches of
privacy.
89
The Privacy Act outlines eleven information privacy principles
("Privacy Principles") that explain how the federal government must handle
personal information.9" In accordance with these principles, the government
can collect personal information for lawful purposes with minimal intrusion
on an individual's privacy, but the individual must be able to access such
information and make corrections if necessary. 91 These principles applied
only to the public sector under the original 1988 law, but the Privacy Act
was amended in 2000 to include the private sector as well.92 As part of the
amendment's strategy93 for the private sector, businesses are allowed to
create industry-wide privacy codes for themselves, which are then to be
approved by Australia's Privacy Commissioner. 94  The Privacy Principles
generally protect information that consumers provide to businesses, with
limitations on how the information may be used and when it may be
disclosed. 95 This approach, requiring minimal legislative involvement in
corporate privacy practices, has been criticized by privacy advocates and
scholars for not going further to protect citizens' privacy.
96
As the Privacy Act and its 2000 amendment stand now, there is one
private sector Privacy Principle that is particularly relevant to an
89 For information regarding the legislative history of the Privacy Act and the structure of the Office
of the Privacy Commissioner, see Paul Kelly, Recent Developments in Private-Sector Personal Data
Protection in Australia: Will There Be An Upside Down Under? 19 J. MARSHALL COMP. & INFO. L. 71
(200. Privacy Act § 14.
91 Id. For further explanation of the principles, see Privacy Laws for the Private Sector Now a
Reali%, 3 No. 9 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 21 (2001).
2 Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act, 2000, (Austl). For commentary on this expansion, see
Steven Klimt et al., Protection of Personal Data: The Australian Perspective, DEF. COUNSEL J. (2003), and
Matthew Kohel, The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000: The Australian Government's Substandard
Attempt to Allay Privacy Concerns and Regulate Internet Privacy in the Private Sector, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
703 (2002).
93 The strategy for protecting private-sector privacy is summarized in National Privacy Principles
(extracted from the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act, 2000, (Austl.)), available at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/npps0l.html (last visited May 12, 2004) [hereinafter National
Privacy Principles].
94 For a list of industries who have created privacy codes, see Office of Federal Privacy
Commissioner, Register of Approved Privacy Codes, at
http://www.privacy.gov.auibusiness/codes/index.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).
95 National Privacy Principles, supra note 93. The private-sector applications of the Privacy Act are
to be reviewed during 2004, after the current privacy commissioner, Malcolm Crompton, leaves office in
April. Rachel Lebihan & Mandy Bryan, Loopholes in Privacy Act Must Go, Say Critics, AUSTRALIAN FIN.
REV., Jan. 5, 2004, at 40.
96 See, e.g., Kohel, supra note 92; John Bentivoglio et al., Global Privacy Law Update, 20 COMPUTER &
INTERNET L. 1 (2003).
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information-sharing network.97 In general, personal information collected
by a business may not be disclosed for a reason unrelated to the primary
purpose of a business, but an exception is granted for law-enforcement
purposes.98 According to Principle 2.1(0, an organization may disclose
personal information if it has:
reason to suspect that unlawful activity has been, is being or
may be engaged in, and uses or discloses the personal
information as a necessary part of its investigation of the matter
or in reporting its concerns to relevant persons or authorities.
99
Businesses may also disclose information for the purposes of law
enforcement for "the prevention, detection, investigation or remedying of
seriously improper conduct or proscribed conduct."
100
A note to this section of the Privacy Principles states that "[i]t is not
intended to deter organisations from lawfully cooperating with agencies
performing law enforcement functions in the performance of their
functions."'' ° While it is not a purpose of the TISN to include the sharing of
personal information,'0 2 if it were disclosed in an investigation, it would be
subject to these sections of the Privacy Act.
With the expansion of ASIO legislation to specifically cover
cyberterrorism and the creation of a TISN, the Australian government has
shown that it is committed to protecting its computer-networked resources.
The lack of clarity in the FOIA and Privacy Act exemptions, as applied to
critical infrastructure information, however, leaves private industries without
a clear plan for progress toward effective cooperation with the government.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF AUSTRALIAN CYBERSECURITY
Although Australia's federal government has demonstrated an
intention to protect its critical infrastructure through public-private
97 See National Privacy Principles, supra note 93.
98 Id. princ. 2, § 2.1(0 & (h).
99 Id. princ. 2, § 2.1(0.
"o Id. princ. 2, § 2.1(h).
... Id. princ. 2.1, n.I.
102 Information Sharing Arrangements, supra note 36 (stating that information will be shared when an
attack exposes a vulnerability, when a vulnerability has been identified which has not yet been exploited, or
in order to work toward "fixing" the potential problem without it becoming public knowledge to avoid
greater exploitation).
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cooperation, efforts are moving ahead slowly.10 3  The slow pace reflects
uncertainty about how to balance security and corporate privacy, and
arguments have been made for both increased government involvement and
more private independence.' 0 4 While that tension should be addressed, delay
on critical infrastructure protection only increases the risk that vulnerabilities
will be exploited.
Cybersecurity experts cite many reasons for Australia's slow progress
in protecting its critical infrastructure. 10 5 Trade groups have blamed the
government for a lack of implementation and regulation of information-
sharing mechanisms. 10 6  Although the CIAC was created in 2002,107 the
government has not used the CIAC to adopt private sector
recommendations. 1s Critics argue that a strained and undefined relationshi,
between the government and the private sector is at the root of the delay.
1 9
Australia's Computer Emergency Response Team ("AusCERT"), appointed
by the Australian government to advise the public and businesses on
cyberthreats as part of the TISN,110 is concerned that other Pacific Rim
countries-including Malaysia, South Korea and Japan-are significantly
outspending Australia's investment in infrastructure security, and that
Australia cannot afford to lag behind."' Moreover, global infrastructure
analysts point to Australia's lack of funding of infrastructure protection as
evidence that the government is pursuing a limited role in this form of
cybersecurity. 
12
A government official in the Attorney-General's Department defends
the government's slow approach, arguing that it is in Australia's interest to
'0' See Rachel Lebihan, Government Belted on Security, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., June 26, 2003, at 19
(discussing criticism of Australia's cybersecurity efforts from the country's "top engineering body").
104 See, e.g., Rachel Lebihan, The Hackers' Adversary, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Feb. 17, 2004, at 32
(quoting a U.S. cybersecurity expert as supporting government identification of trusted Internet users, but
also recognizing that if a government requires an Internet service provider to have high levels of security,
those costs will be passed on to consumers and they will switch to a different provider).
105 Id.
106 id.
107 Press Release, Attorney-General Daryl Williams & Sen. Richard Alston, Protecting Australia's
Critical Infrastructure, (Nov. 29, 2002), available at http ://www.cript.gov.au
/www/CriptHome.nsf/HeadingPagesDisplay/Press+Release?OpenDocument. (last visited May 21, 2004).
0 Lebihan, supra note 103.
159 Id.
110 Nathan Cochrane & Sue Cant, Australia Leaves the Hack Door Open to Cyber Sabotage, AGE
(Melbourne), Apr. 8, 2003, at 1.
I1 Id.
112 Max Blenkin, Aust Easily Disabled by Infrastructure Attacks - Analyst, AAP NEWSFEED
(Canberra), Feb. 17, 2004 (discussing Swiss security analyst Dr. Adam Cobb's review of global critical
infrastructure).
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make sure the TISN is effective.1 13  Along the same lines, Australia's
delayed development of a critical infrastructure security scheme similar to
the United States' has been called an advantage, as it might afford Australia
the opportunity to learn from the failures and successes of the U.S.
example. 
14
At least one member of Parliament has called for more government
regulation of infrastructure security and for the private sector to make
cybersecurity a top priority. 1 5 She also argues that the private sector will
not share system vulnerabilities merely because of voluntary requests from
the government, but only if it is required to do so under law.1 16 She also
points to infrastructure security legislation in both the United States and
Great Britain as examples of minimal, but effective standards required for
the private sector.'7 The Attorney-General's Department has responded by
stating that, because legal regulation of private-sector security would require
the government to inquire into countless industries' security systems,'
18
requiring the private sector to share security information would only be a
last resort should voluntary sharing fail." 19
In a time of heightened sensitivity to the threat of terrorism, the
publicity surrounding potential cybervulnerabilities legitimately worries
both critical infrastructure industries and the public. When the Australian
government published a 1998 report on terrorist vulnerabilities in
communications and utilities industries on its website in July 2003, with
information on how terrorists could infiltrate those industries, some media
outlets called the publication a "breach of security."' 120  The Attorney-
General's Department replied that national security was not threatened
because the report was already public information, was outdated, and
because the vulnerabilities had already been fixed.121  Even though this
report allegedly had limited security value, the fact that reports of system
vulnerabilities alarm the public gives credence to corporate insistence that
cybersecurity information supplied to the government must be kept private
13 Lebihan, supra note 103 (quoting Mike Rothery, the Attorney-General's Senior Adviser on
national information infrastructure).
114 Id.
115 Cochrane & Cant, supra note 110. See also SEN. KATE LUNDY'S WEB PAGE,
http://www.katelundy.com.au (for statements and press releases, suggesting that Australia needs to take
cybersecurity more seriously and ensure that the TISN makes progress) (last visited May 21, 2004).
116 See Cochrane & Cant, supra note 110.
117 Id.
118 Id.
19 Gary Hughes, Gas, Water Companies Vulnerable, SUNDAY AGE (Melbourne), June 22, 2003, at 7.
2o Govt Denies Terror Blue-Print Threatens National Security, AAP NEWSFEED (Canberra), July 29,
2003.
121 Id.
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to protect market competitiveness. The public is becoming more aware of
the risks of vulnerabilities in public and private networks, and the Australian
government needs to take decisive steps to ensure the protection of critical
infrastructure.
V. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
In many ways, the cybersecurity situation in the United States
parallels Australian attempts to increase its protection of critical
infrastructure. The United States began to recognize the need for national
critical infrastructure protection in the late 1990s, and these extra years of
experience gave it a head start over Australia. As such, Australia should
look to the U.S. experience in developing its own cybersecurity measures.
A. New Threats and Changing Law Enforcement Priorities Caused the
Evolution of U.S. Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategies
In 1998, the United States Department of Justice and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation created the National Infrastructure Protection Center
("NIPC") as a clearinghouse for the sharing of information relating to the
security of critical infrastructure.' 22 As defined by the Critical Infrastructure
Information Security Act of 2001, critical infrastructure includes:
physical and cyber-based systems and services essential to the
national defense, government, or economy of the United States,
including systems essential for telecommunications (including
voice and data transmission and the Internet), electrical power,
gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance,
transportation, water supply, emergency services (including
medical, fire, and police services), and the continuity of
government operations.123
At the time of NIPC's creation in 1998, the goals of the U.S.
government were to create a critical infrastructure that would be
invulnerable to intentional attacks by 2000, and to be running at "enhanced
122 Dick, supra note 14, at 3.
123 This definition comes from the unenacted Critical Infrastructure Information Security Act, S.
1456, 107th Cong. § 4(2) (2001) [hereinafter CIISA]. For other definitions of "critical infrastructure"
found in legislation and private documents, see Joseph Summerill, Is it Safe For Your Client to Provide the
Government With Homeland Security Data?, 50-JAN FED. LAW. 24, n.7 (2003).
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capability ' 124 by 2003.12' As the United States developed early models of
infrastructure protection, the government's role in cybersecurity received
attention. 1 26 When it became apparent that the private sector was the main
provider of critical infrastructure services, however, the government's
strategy shifted to focus more on the security of private businesses.
127
Following the events of September 11, 2001, NIPC was absorbed into
the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") Information Analysis
Infrastructure Protection Division.1 28  Other federal agencies dealing with
infrastructure security, including the Department of Defense's National
Communication System and the Commerce Department's Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office and Computer Security Division, were also
reorganized under the umbrella of DHS. 129 Through the consolidation of
federal departments and agencies working on infrastructure security, the
government intended to facilitate more efficient information sharing
between groups and avoid redundancies among staff resources across
separate offices. 1
30
NIPC requests information related to security threats and measures
taken to remedy the threats from public and private sector infrastructure
industries. 131  While the government is still asking the private sector to
volunteer information related to infrastructure security, recent U.S.
legislation, particularly a recent addition to Freedom of Information Act'
32
("U.S. FOIA") exemptions, has made privacy concerns related to
information-sharing less burdensome on private industries.
1 33
124 "Enhanced capability" is defined in contrast to "initial operating capability," but the term is not
specifically defined. This lack of clarity in definitions is noted as problematic later in the document.
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES, supra note 30, at 5.
125 Id.
126 See Richard Clarke, Threats to U.S. National Security: Proposed Partnership Initiatives Towards
Preventing Cyber Terrorist Attacks, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 33, 38-39 (1999).
127 SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES, supra note 30, at 25.
2' See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: INFORMATION SHARING
RESPONSIBILITIES, CHALLENGES, AND KEY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 13 (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03715t.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter INFORMATION
SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES].
29 SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES, supra note 30, at 13-14.
"0 See id. at 14.
132 Sumnmerill, supra note 123, at 25.
232 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552.
213 Id. at 26.
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B. Corporate Privacy Concerns Exist About Information Shared with the
U.S. Government for Infrastructure Protection Because Corporate
Information Could Make its Way into the Public Domain
One of the concerns of private U.S. industries has been the application
of the U.S. FOIA to any information they voluntarily submit to DHS.'34
Because U.S. FOIA is primarily applicable to government agencies, a
private sector business is not the typical target of a U.S. FOIA disclosure
request.135  Because DHS receives information from the private sector in
connection with system vulnerabilities, however, such information could
conceivably be subjected to a U.S. FOIA claim, thus rendering sensitive
private business material available to the public.'
36
The Critical Infrastructure Information Security Act ("CIISA"),
proposed in 2001 but never enacted, would have eliminated this possibility
by adding a new disclosure exemption for infrastructure security documents
voluntarily submitted to the government.13 7  While U.S. FOIA already
includes an exemption for confidential business information and documents
related to national security and law enforcement, CIISA would have made it
clear to private critical infrastructure-related companies that their corporate
privacy would remain protected from disclosure. 38  CIISA explicitly
protected voluntarily submitted information, not only from U.S. FOIA
claims, but also from use by other government agencies for any purpose
other than the protection of critical infrastructure. 1
39
When DHS was created in 2002, many of the goals of CIISA were
realized.140 Section 214 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ("HSA"), is
entitled "Protection of Voluntarily Shared Critical Infrastructure
Information" and includes an exemption from U.S. FOIA for such
documents. 4 1 The HSA also prohibits government agencies and other third
parties from using such information in a civil action against the provider if
the information was submitted in good-faith compliance with security
standards. 42  The HSA also makes clear that voluntary submission of
134 Sumnerill, supra note 123, at 25. This same concern was raised during the preparation for Y2K,
and information shared with the government under the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-271, § 4(f)(3)(A) (1998).
135 See Summerill, supra note 123, at 26.
136 id.
:37 CIISA, supra note 123, § 5(a)(1)(A).
38 id. § 5.
139 id.
140 See 148 CONG. REC. SI 1, 562-63 (daily ed. Nov. 19,2002) (statement of Sen. Bennett).141 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § (a)(1)(A), 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
142 Id. § (a)(1)(C).
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infrastructure information does not constitute a waiver of trade secret
protection. 143
Civil liberties groups and scholars decry the new U.S. FOIA
exemption in the HSA as eliminating a vital check on government abuse.
144
Especially considering that U.S. FOIA already includes an exemption for
documents relating to national security and law enforcement, and also
exempts confidential business information, these groups argue that another
exemption is unnecessary.145 These groups assert that there is no evidence
that such a U.S. FOIA exception would succeed in encouraging private
industries to turn over infrastructure-related information to the government,
and that it is more likely that industries are not concerned about U.S. FOIA
disclosures. 46  If the proposed exemption merely serves to protect the
government from embarrassing public revelations of infrastructure
weaknesses, these groups are concerned that U.S. FOIA's purpose of
promoting open government would be undermined. 147 Furthermore, these
groups have argued that public citizens have a right to know about
infrastructure vulnerabilities. 148  If industries are exempt from both
disclosure of and liability for their cyberweaknesses, they argue, the sharing
of information will not enhance protection of U.S. national security.1
49
Prior to passage of the HSA, the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs heard testimony noting that U.S. FOIA's fourth exemption already
covers confidential commercial information obtained by the government.
50
The government defended the HSA exemption as necessary to encourage the
sharing of information.' 5 ' Unlike in Australia, where privacy legislation has
recently been extended to include the private sector, the United States has
141 Id. § (a)(l)(F).
144 See Securing our Infrastructure: Public/Private Information Sharing: Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of David L. Sobel, Electronic Privacy
Information Center) (transcript available at http://www.epic.org/security/infowar/sobel_testimony.html)
(last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter EPIC Statement]; Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to
Sens. Lieberman & Thompson, Statement for the Record Concerning Public-Private Information-Sharing
and Critical Infrastructure Security (June 5, 2002), available at
http://www.aclu.orgfNationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=10
4 24 &c=108 (last visited May 21, 2004)
[hereinafter ACLU Letter];. See also Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom ofInformation Act
Post-9/ll: Balancing the Public's Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland
Security, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 261, 296-97 (2003).
145 See ACLU Letter, supra note 144. For more information about FOIA exemptions, see Summerill,
supra note 123, at 26.
146 See ACLU Letter, supra note 144.
147 Id.
141 See EPIC Statement, supra note 144 (because if a private business can hide its vulnerabilities, it
does not have an incentive to increase security).
149 id.
15o Id.
151 Summerill, supra note 123, at 27.
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not regulated the privacy practices of private U.S. business. 152  While the
private sector might be ignorant of the privacy safeguards in existing U.S.
FOIA exemptions, the government nonetheless argued that adding an
exemption would indicate its commitment to the privacy of private
industries and consumers. 53  According to the government, the broad
protections outlined in the case law surrounding U.S. FOIA's fourth
exemption 54 do not satisfy industry concerns that their specific information
will be not be disclosed. Thus, a clear exemption for infrastructure security
information is needed.1
55
U.S. government officials have noted this tension between public and
private interests as the need for critical infrastructure protection has gained
publicity, especially after the August 2003 massive blackout on the East
Coast of the United States.' 56  One legislator succinctly described the
inherent tension between the public interest and concerns of the business
community:
So we are sitting there trying to struggle as a Congress and as
an administrative agency that the Department of Homeland
Security is, and ask how do we get industry to step up to the
plate and protect these critical assets to the point where we need
it to be, while at the same time we understand that the important
thing for business is the bottom line.'
57
C. Public-Private Partnerships Are Helping the United States Take
Additional Steps to Protect Its Critical Infrastructure in All Sectors
DHS has divided the U.S. critical infrastructure into various
152 See Sarah Andrews, Protecting Privacy Through Government Regulation, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 6
(2001).
153 See John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, statement before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs (May 8, 2002) (transcript available at http://govt-
aff.senate.gov/050802malcolm.htm) (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter Malcolm Statement]; see also
Surnmerill, supra note 123, at 27.
114 Found at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), this provision exempts documents that are "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" from U.S.
FOIA disclosure.
155 See Malcolm Statement, supra note 153. This viewpoint was supported by industry groups such
as the Information Technology Association of America. See Critical Information Protection, at
http://www.itaa.org/es/cne/cipover.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).
156 Power Play: Protecting America's Power Grid, 2 THE CIP REPORT 10-12 (2004), available at
http://techcenter.gmu.edu/programs/cipp/cipreportcip report_2.7.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004).
I5 d. at 12 (quoting Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA)).
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Information Sharing and Analysis Centers ("ISACs"), 158  such as
telecommunications and public utilities, with the assumption that
communication will be most effective between groups within the same
industry. 59 DHS has appointed applicable federal agencies or industry
leaders to sponsor each ISAC.160 For example, the U.S. Treasury is the lead
for the financial services ISAC, 161 and the non-profit Food Marketing
Institute oversees the food and agriculture ISAC.162 Businesses within each
sector have the opportunity to join their corresponding ISAC, usually for a
fee.
163
Once a particular business joins an ISAC, it then has access to alerts
and warnings of cyberattacks for that industry and can share information on
building more secure networks. 64 Upon request from the U.S. government,
an ISAC can provide a sanitized 165 compilation of a sector's threats and
security efforts. 16 6  The threat information may then be analyzed by
government security experts, who can recommend remedies. 167  The ISAC
system has facilitated progress on critical infrastructure protection through
increased organization.
The ISAC system, however, is not without flaws. A recent
symposium 69 of all the ISACs revealed that most industries do not have the
'58 For a list of all ISACs and links to information on them, see Department of Homeland Security,
Threats and Protection: Information Sharing & Analysis Centers, at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=73&content-1375 (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter
DHS ISAC].
159 Preliminary Findings of the CIP Project's ISAC Symposium, Nov. 17, 2003, at 2, available at
http://techcenter.gmu.edu/programs/conferences/isacsymposium-overview.pdf (last visited May 21,2004).20; See DHS ISAC, supra note 158.
161 See Financial Services ISAC, Home, at http://www.fsisac.com (last visited May 21, 2004).
162 See Food and Agriculture ISAC, Home, at http://www.fmi.org/isac (last visited May 21, 2004).
163 See, e.g., Financial Services ISAC, Next Generation FS/ISAC Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.fsisac.com/faq.cfm (last visited May 21, 2004) (explaining membership fees for the financial
services sector) [hereinafter FSISAC FAQ]. Basic membership is free, but basic members receive only
urgent and crisis alerts and can participate in sector surveys. Core membership, which costs $750, allows
participants to receive a wider range of alerts and provides limited access to the FS-ISAC web site.
Premier membership, available for US$ 10,000, provides the full range of alert options and web site access,
participation in conference calls and meetings, and use of the resources of a staffed security center. Id.
See, e.g., Financial Services ISAC, About Us, at http://www.fsisac.com/aboutus.cfin (last visited
May 21, 2004).
165 This means that the document has no without any identifying marks to an individual business or
trade secret.
166 FSISAC FAQ, supra note 163.
167 Id.
6' See INFORMATION SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 128, at 22.
169 Hosted by George Mason University School of Law, which runs a Critical Infrastructure
Protection Project ("CIP Project"), in conjunction with James Madison University. See Preliminary
Findings of the CIP Project's ISAC Symposium, supra note 159. According to Appendix A of the findings
report, the following industries were represented at this symposium: banking and finance, chemicals,
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necessary funding or staffing to fully engage in effective infrastructure
protection. 170 Additionally, the symposium found that roles of the
government and of the private sector are not clearly delineated, which can
lead to duplication of efforts and confusion of responsibilities. 1 ' This
confusion has led to increased debate about the proper structures and
allocations of authority among ISACs without implementation of any
solutions. 
72
One way to alleviate such confusion could be for the U.S. government
to make critical infrastructure protection mandatory for businesses in those
industries, but it could prove difficult to implement because of potential
private sector opposition. DHS has not completely eliminated this
possibility, although businesses are generally opposed to increased
government involvement in the corporate realm. 1
73
Some scholars have noted that the true problems of infrastructure
protection have not even been addressed because of the preliminary
problems associated with information-sharing. 74  These problems include
both the threat of disclosure of private corporate information under U.S.
FOIA, and direct federal entanglement with private-sector cybersecurity.1
75
In order to make communication possible between public and private
sectors, these two legal issues surrounding critical infrastructure protection
must be addressed. 1
76
electric power, emergency management and response, emergency law enforcement, food, information
technology, interstate, oil and gas, railroad, surface transportation, telecommunications, water supply, and
healthcare. Id.
"To Id. at 2.
"' Id. at 9. See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:
CHALLENGES & EFFORTS TO SECURE CONTROL SYSTEMS 23 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04354.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter CHALLENGES AND
EFFORTS]. The U.S. General Accounting Office has recommended that DHS focus on developing a clearer
strategy for cooperation between the private sector and the government, with a comprehensive plan due in
December 2004. Id. at 24.
172 Paula Scalingi, Reflections on the State of Infrastructure Security, 2 THE CIP REPORT 3 (Dec.
2003), available at http://techcenter.gmu.edu/programs/cipp/cipreport/cipreport_2.6.pdf (last visited May
21,2004).
173 Sean Gorman, CIP Reflections: Three Issues for Academic Consideration, 2 THE CIP REPORT 4
(Dec. 2003), available at techcenter.gmu.edu/programs/cipp/cipreport/ciprepor_2.6.pdf (last visited
May 21, 2004). Gorman quotes a DHS official: "Regulation is not off the table, but at the end of the day
that's not where we want to be." Id. (quoting www.eweek.com/print article/0,3048,a=11386 2 ,00.asp).
"' Id. at 4.
175 Id. at 17. The Financial Services ISAC web site suggests that an incentive for financial
institutions to join the ISAC and make it effective is to avoid government regulation. Financial Services
ISAC, at http://www.fsisac.com/faq.cfm (last visited May 21, 2004). See generally, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING
NATIONAL CAPABILITIES 72-73 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01323.pdf (last visited
May 21, 2004).
176 See Gorman, supra note 173, at 17-18.
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The first issue has already been officially addressed through the
enactment of the DHS exemption from U.S. FOIA, 177 and as this is tested
and supported by private industries, critical infrastructure protection
strategies can be further developed and implemented. 178  Corporate
resistance to government regulation, the second threat to private
infrastructure protection, cannot be overcome simply by legislation, but
recent efforts by the electric power industry suggest a possible model of
cooperation in lieu of unilateral government regulation. 1
79
1. NERC Regulations Can Serve as a Model for Public-Private
Cooperation on Information-Sharing
The North American Electric Reliability Council ("NERC") was
named ISAC for the electricity sector,' 80 and complied with the U.S.
government's request for a draft of minimum standards for computer
network security for the nation's electricity grids.' 18  Because a breach in
security within the electricity sector can result in such drastic consequences,
NERC recognized that implementing security standards is an issue that
warrants the attention of the electricity industry. 82
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission included these standards
in its regulations and opened the drafts for a period of public comment.'
83
The public comment period is still open, but NERC is already at work on
developing methods for implementing the standards. 184  Once member
companies adopt the standards as NERC requirements, energy organizations
will self-certify that they are complying with the standards. 185  This
"' For further description of how DHS currently maintains the privacy of critical infrastructure
information, see Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074 (Feb. 20,
2004).
17B See Gorman, supra note 173, at 18.
179 James A. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection: With All Deliberate Speed, 2 THE CIP REPORT
5 (2003), available at http://techcenter.gmu.edu/programs/cipp/cipreport/cipreport 2.6.pdf (last visited
May 21, 2004).
'80 North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), Critical Infrastructure Protection, at
http://www.nerc.com/cip.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
's See Lewis, supra note 179, at 19.
1 NERC, Cybersecurity Standard: Frequently Asked Questions,
ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all-updl/standards/FAQ-CyberSecurity.doc (last visited May 21, 2004).
83 See Lewis, supra note 179, at 19.
54 Id.; NERC, Implementation Plan-Urgent Action Cyber Security Standard, at
ftp://ftp.nerc.com/pub/sys/all-updl/standards/ImplementationPlan-cyberstd-6-1O.doc (last visited Apr. 26,
2004) [hereinafter Implementation Plan]. See also Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open
Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, 68 Fed. Reg. 4401-01 (Jan. 29,
2003) (noting the development of NERC's cyberstandards, and the technical conference held to discuss the
standards).
"5 See Lewis, supra note 179, at 19.
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certification process will require electricity entities to claim compliance or
explain their degree of non-compliance. 86  NERC will not conduct
investigations to verify these self-certifications.1 87 Such certifications will
be confidential, and not disclosed by NERC.1 88 The standards implemented
by NERC will be in effect for 2004 only, and then will be re-assessed for
2005 and beyond. 189 While the NERC situation is unique because most of
the bulk electric grid operators are members of NERC and therefore already
subject to its standards, 190 this model of industry-created self-certifying
standards enforced by the government is one way of achieving infrastructure
protection while maintaining corporate input.
By creating a specific U.S. FOIA exemption for information shared
with the government for critical infrastructure protection, and finding a
successful model for public-private partnership in the electricity sector, the
United States is making progress toward security. The roles of government
and the private sector in critical infrastructure protection are being examined
and delineated, and this clarity will make future protection efforts more
effective. Public-private partnerships still need to expand into other sectors,
but the recent years of progress suggest that cooperation between the private
sector and the government will continue to increase.
VI. U.S. LESSONS IN INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY THAT AUSTRALIA
SHOULD CONSIDER ADOPTING
While Australia and the United States agree that critical infrastructure
protection is a government priority and a necessary part of an effective
counterterrorism campaign, Australia is still in comparatively early stages of
developing a national plan for cybersecurity. The debate surrounding the
need for balance between corporate security and public awareness exists in
both countries, 19 1 yet the United States has taken specific action to
encourage further steps toward complete protection of its critical
infrastructure. 92 Australia should consider these steps in designing and
186 See Implementation Plan, supra note 184.
187 Id.
's Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
19' Not all agree that the United States has appropriately and/or effectively balanced privacy and
security in its efforts to protect critical infrastructure, but this Comment argues that the continuing U.S.
debate over these issues should be considered in the Australian decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Mark
Ellison, America's Response to 9/11 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
9' See CHALLENGES AND EFFORTS, supra note 171, at 21. The U.S. General Accounting Office has
requested that DHS create a comprehensive plan for national infrastructure by December 2004. Id. at 8.
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adopting its own program of cybersecurity.
Like their U.S. counterparts, Australian businesses are legitimately
concerned about sharing information regarding system vulnerabilities with
the government because of a fear that the government might disclose their
cyberweaknesses. They would rather maintain a good reputation among
consumers and investors with respect to their cyberstrength and address
threats on their own, rather than risk exposing their vulnerability to the
public. Australian businesses should not have to choose between their
reputations and their cybersecurity. Legislative bodies should provide
corporate privacy safeguards such as an additional AusFOIA exemption for
this specific type of security-related information. While it is true that
existing AusFOIA exemptions, like their U.S. FOIA counterparts, may apply
to business information voluntarily shared with the government, the inertia
of business reticence to share information could be more effectively
overcome if the exemptions were clarified. If corporate information shared
with the government as part of a security effort is given a specific AusFOIA
exemption, corporate concerns regarding misuse of such information would
no longer serve as a justification that businesses could use to resist security-
related information-sharing plans. This approach was used in the United
States, with a specific U.S. FOIA exemption given in the DHS Act to
private-sector infrastructure information shared with the government.
The second preliminary concern facing Australian businesses is the
level of government involvement in private-sector information-sharing.
While government regulation is generally considered a hindrance to
corporate success, a system of purely voluntary information sharing has been
lethargic at best in the United States 93 and would likely have a similar effect
in Australia. Nevertheless, the U.S. approach to identifying specific
infrastructure sectors and creating an ISAC hierarchy among them has
promoted at least some semblance of organization to the U.S. cyber-
protection effort, especially with the creation of DHS. DHS has brought
together the previously fragmented infrastructure-protection groups and
organized them into a single, yet multi-layered, web of cybersecurity
offices. 194
193 See INFORMATION SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 128, at 18 (arguing that government-led
organization of critical infrastructure industries has supported better communication and actual information
sharin, but further efforts are still needed to meet all the challenges).
The efficiency promoted by centralization of resources, as seen in the DHS example, has also led
some to suggest that the United States, like Australia and other countries, should create a federal privacy
agency. William S. Challis & Ann Cavoukian, The Case for a U.S. Privacy Commissioner: A Canadian
Commissioner's Perspective, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 1, 36 (2000). This argument is
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At this time, Australia does not have a federal department devoted to
security issues. While the creation of a department like DHS could result in
more effective communication and clearer delineation of roles in Australia's
infrastructure protection efforts, the mere creation of such a department has
not produced complete compliance with critical infrastructure protection
plans in the United States. With or without a federal security department,
Australia should recognize that an element more crucial to successful
information sharing in the United States has been the balancing of corporate
self-regulation and government-enforced compliance.
Although increased cyberstrength could be an incentive for businesses
to share information on network vulnerabilities, U.S. businesses have been
reluctant to invest in critical infrastructure protection. 95 Using the U.S.
energy sector as a working model of infrastructure protection, however,
demonstrates that cooperative regulation between the public and private
sectors is possible. This is especially true when the private sector is actively
involved in the creation of its own standards that can be implemented and
enforced by the government.
The Australian government should mirror this cooperation in its own
critical infrastructure sectors as a preliminary step toward complete security.
Australia itself has used such a model of cooperative regulation in its private
sector privacy legislation.' 96 While the cooperative regulation method has
its critics, 197 it does serve as a first step toward effective critical
infrastructure protection, and the level of federal regulation could be
increased if early efforts prove ineffective. The self-certification process for
corporate cybersecurity allows for corporate autonomy, but also meets the
government's interest in furthering the awareness and implementation of
critical infrastructure protection. Self-regulation is a step toward greater
awareness of the problems inherent in networked critical infrastructure
computer networks. Because Australia has used self-regulation systems in
other areas of cyberspace and privacy, 198 it should apply the same regime to
strengthened by the fact that U.S. privacy law is not found in one piece of legislation, but fragmented in
many legislative sources. See David Bender, Privacy Law, 717 PLI/Pat 563 (2002).
195 See CHALLENGES & EFFORTS, supra note 171, at 19 (suggesting that businesses do not focus on
cybersecurity because they believe cyberattacks are rare, and thus possibly expensive protection plans are
not economically justifiable).
196 Australia has also used a self-regulation system in its laws on restricted adult content on the
Interet. See Ulrich Sieber, Responsibility of Internet Providers: Comparative Analysis of a Basic
Question ofInformation Law, in LAW, INFORMATION & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 231-92 (Eli Lederman
& Ron Shapira eds., 2001).
197 See, e.g., Sieber, supra note 196, at 265; KLAUS GREWLICH, GOVERNANCE IN 'CYBERSPACE':
ACCESS AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS 292-297 (1999).
198 See Kobel, supra note 92.
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critical infrastructure protection in order to provide greater security.
As soon as possible, Australia should take initial steps to identify lead
organizations in each sector (like NERC in the U.S. electricity sector) and
then direct members of each sector to meet and draft standards among
themselves. Dividing the sectors into industry specific ISAC-like units is
crucial to the fostering of open communication within industries; the
information-sharing should be mostly between businesses of the same sector
to promote not only effective conversation but also to limit the amount of
information that eventually is shared with the government.
VII. CONCLUSION
While not all of the U.S. sectors have reached full compliance with
their respective critical infrastructure protection program at this point, the
progress the United States has made in at least two areas should be mirrored
in Australia. An AusFOIA exemption for corporate information shared with
the government for cybersecurity purposes could, like the exemption added
to the U.S. FOIA, reassure the private sector that the government respects
corporate privacy. AusFOIA already contains a list of exemptions, so an
additional exemption could be added without disrupting the statutory
scheme.
The United States has also made some progress in developing public-
private partnerships, which provide mechanisms for setting standards and
enforcement. Although the private sector is loath to be subjected to
increased government regulation, the U.S. system of ISACs has produced a
minimally intrusive method of encouraging cybersecurity efforts. Australia
should work to create a similar system to allow its various sectors to create
their own standards for compliance and methods of enforcement before
resorting to stricter government regulation.
In the arena of critical infrastructure protection, a federal government
must balance private sector privacy and competitive strategy against the
public interest in preventing cyberterrorism. Although this balance has been
debated in the United States for years, the U.S. model has not yet been
perfected. Even without success in all areas of critical infrastructure
protection, however, the United States has been working in this arena for
years already, and Australia can learn from this experience of both success
and challenge in developing its own infrastructure protection strategy.
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